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Long-term evidence for the effect of pay-for-performance in 
primary care on mortality in the UK: a population study
Andrew M Ryan, Sam Krinsky, Evangelos Kontopantelis, Tim Doran
Summary
Background Introduced in 2004, the UK’s Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the world’s largest primary 
care pay-for-performance programme. We tested whether the QOF was associated with reduced population mortality.
Methods We used population-level mortality statistics between 1994 and 2010 for the UK and other high-income 
countries that were not exposed to pay-for-performance. The primary outcome was age-adjusted and sex-adjusted 
mortality per 100 000 people for a composite outcome of chronic disorders that were targeted by the QOF. Secondary 
outcomes were age-adjusted and sex-adjusted mortality for ischaemic heart disease, cancer, and a composite of all 
non-targeted conditions. For each study outcome, we created a so-called synthetic UK as a weighted combination of 
comparison countries. We then estimated diference-in-diferences models to test whether mortality fell more in the 
UK than in the synthetic UK after the QOF.
Findings Introduction of the QOF was not signiicantly associated with changes in population mortality for the 
composite outcome (–3·68 per 100 000 population [95% CI –8·16 to 0·80]; p=0·107), ischaemic heart disease 
(–2·21 per 100 000 [–6·86 to 2·44]; p=0·357), cancer (0·28 per 100 000 [–0·99 to 1·55]; p=0·679), or all non-targeted 
conditions (11·60 per 100 000 [–3·91 to 27·11]; p=0·143).
Interpretation Although we noted small mortality reductions for a composite outcome of targeted disorders, the QOF 
was not associated with signiicant changes in mortality. Our indings have implications for the probable efects of 
similar programmes on population health outcomes. The relation between incentives and mortality needs to be 
assessed in speciic disease domains.
Funding None.
Introduction
Efective primary care can prevent illness and delay death 
by identifying and modifying risk factors,1 diagnosing 
disease at an early stage,2 and coordinating efective 
disease management.3 In view of the low cost of diagnosis 
and treatment of disease in primary care compared with 
management of the complications of disease in acute 
settings, improvement of population health through 
enhanced primary care has tremendous potential to 
improve the value of health-care spending. Despite its 
importance, copious research suggests that high-quality 
primary care is underprovided.4 This inadequate 
provision is due in part to health-care payment systems. 
In the USA, fee-for-service payment encourages high-
intensity, procedure-based care rather than population-
based patient management. In socialised health systems 
such as that in the UK, capitated payments encourage 
population-based approaches, but payments have 
traditionally been detached from quality of care.5
In response, many pay-for-performance initiatives have 
attempted to directly tie payment to quality of care. The 
UK’s Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the 
world’s largest pay-for-performance programme. It was 
introduced for all family practices in 2004, linking up to 
25% of family practitioners’ income to performance for 
more than 100 publicly reported quality indicators 
relating to management of chronic disease, organisation 
of care, and patient experience.6 Notwithstanding an 
announcement that Scotland plans to eliminate the QOF 
in 2016, it currently remains in place across the whole of 
the UK. The magnitude of the inancial incentives for 
clinical indicators varies substantially by disease area. 
For instance, in 2005, payments of up to £15 125 were 
available for the average family practice across 
15 ischaemic heart disease and heart failure indicators, 
but only £1500 was available across two cancer indicators.
Research into the QOF suggests that the programme 
accelerated improvement for the incentivised indicators 
relative to preintervention trends in the 3 years after its 
implementation.7 However, this improvement attenuated 
with time.8 Conceptually, increased quality care through 
the QOF could reduce risk factors for acute events such 
as myocardial infarction and stroke, lowering associated 
mortality. Evidence from randomised controlled trials 
shows that 25 indicators in the QOF are associated with 
mortality reductions.9 Attempts have been made to use 
this evidence to extrapolate quality improvement noted 
in the QOF to potential population mortality reductions.9 
However, evidence of eicacy from clinical trials might 
not translate into patient beneits in the real world of 
health-care delivery.10 Additionally, measured quality 
improvement in the QOF could be partly driven by 
improved record keeping or manipulated performance 
statistics11 and might not lead to improved outcomes. In 
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this study, we compare changes in population mortality 
between the UK and countries that have not been 
exposed to large-scale pay-for-performance programmes 
to test whether the QOF is associated with broad 
improvements in population health.
Methods
Data sources
We used country-level, cause-speciic mortality and popu-
lation data from the WHO mortality database12 between 
1994 and 2010. For observations with missing population 
data (12% of country-years), we substituted population 
estimates from the US Census Bureau’s international 
data base.13 We used data for country characteristics from 
several sources, including the Penn World Tables,14 the 
International Labour Organization key indicators of the 
labour market database,15 the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database,16 and country health system 
classiications from Böhm and colleagues.17
Study design and population
We used a retrospective cohort design to test whether 
mortality for disease areas that were targeted by the QOF 
decreased more in the UK than in comparison countries 
in the 7 years after the QOF was introduced. Our 
comparison group consisted of countries that were 
classiied in previous research as having a high-income 
epidemiological proile.18 Of these countries, we excluded 
ive because of extensive missing mortality data 
(Switzerland, Brunei, Andorra, Cyprus, and Malta), 
resulting in a set of 27 comparison countries.
Outcomes
Our primary outcome was age-adjusted and sex-adjusted 
mortality per 100 000 population for a composite outcome 
of disease areas that were targeted by the QOF from the 
beginning of the programme and had clinical evidence 
supporting the link between the incentivised indicators and 
mortality reduction.9 These diseases were ischaemic heart 
disease, hypertension, stroke (including transient 
ischaemic attack), diabetes, chronic kidney disease, asthma, 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (see appendix 
for detailed deinitions of disease areas). Although chronic 
kidney disease was introduced into the QOF only in the 
third year of the programme, we included it in our 
composite outcome because of its association with diabetes 
and hypertension. In view of the interrelated nature of 
chronic disease, better care for a speciic disease area (eg, 
diabetes) could contribute to reduced mortality for several 
causes of death (eg, diabetes, stroke, ischaemic heart 
disease, and chronic kidney disease). By considering 
composite mortality for several related disease areas, our 
outcome captures changes in mortality for causes of death 
that might not be directly related to improvement in care 
for the same disease area.
We assessed three secondary outcomes: age-adjusted 
and sex-adjusted mortality for ischaemic heart disease, 
cancer, and all causes of death that were not included in 
the primary outcome. We assessed ischaemic heart disease 
as a separate outcome because it is a leading cause of death 
in the UK and had the strongest inancial incentives in the 
QOF (22% of total clinical incentives in the original 
programme).6 We assessed cancer and all causes of death 
that were not included in the primary outcome as negative 
controls because we did not expect the QOF to substantially 
afect mortality for these causes of death. We assessed 
cancer separately because, by contrast with ischaemic 
heart disease, the cancer indicators in the QOF are not 
supported by clinical evidence for efect on outcomes and 
had weak inancial incentives (<1% of total incentives).9 
Research in context 
Evidence before this study
We searched Embase and PubMed with the terms “quality”, 
“outcomes framework”, “incentive”, “primary care”, “mortality”, 
“death*”, “life expectancy”, “primary health care”, “value-based 
purchasing”, and “pay-for-performance”. We set no limit for 
language of publication and searched for articles published up to 
Dec 18, 2015. We reviewed all studies and trials, including 
observational studies and accompanying editorials. Investigators 
of many studies, predominantly observational, have examined 
the effect of incentive schemes on patient outcomes, but only 
one has addressed the effect of a national primary care pay-for-
performance scheme on mortality. No previous cross-national 
studies have compared countries that implemented large-scale 
pay-for-performance with countries that did not.
Added value of this study
Investigators of previous studies have noted that financial 
incentive schemes can lead to slight improvements in 
incentivised aspects of care, but other aspects might be 
negatively affected, and the effects on patient outcomes are 
variable. We compared changes in mortality for disorders 
included in a major national primary care pay-for-performance 
programme in the UK with those in other high-income 
countries that did not introduce pay-for-performance. We 
noted no significant decrease in mortality in the UK after 
introduction of the incentive programme.
Implications of all the available evidence
Pay-for-performance might not be an effective method for 
improvement of population health. The costs and effectiveness 
of pay-for-performance programmes should be compared with 
other health system interventions to better understand than at 
present how resources can best be used to improve population 
outcomes.
See Online for appendix
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Causes of death that were not included in the primary 
outcome included some disease areas that were targeted 
by the programme, but these either lacked clinical evidence 
linking the incentivised indicator to mortality reduction 
(eg, cancer) or were only introduced in the third year of the 
programme (eg, atrial ibrillation).
Statistical analysis
To enable a direct comparison across countries, mortality 
for each country was standardised by age and sex to the 
2004 UK population structure. We limited our calculation 
of population mortality to the population aged 74 years or 
younger in view of uncertainty about causes of death at 
older ages.19 We standardised mortality to account for 
discontinuities associated with country-speciic changes 
from the ICD9 to ICD10 classiication systems for causes 
of death (appendix). Finally, we adjusted mortality to 
account for potential undercounting of deaths in the 
targeted disease areas due to use of ill-deined cause of 
death codes on death registrations (appendix).20
We used a diference-in-diferences analysis to assess 
whether the QOF improved mortality in the UK to a 
greater extent than in comparison countries. The crucial 
assumption for diference-in-diferences analysis is that 
the treatment and comparison groups have equivalent 
trends for the study outcome before the start of the 
intervention: the parallel trends assumption. This 
assumption implies that, without treatment, outcomes 
for the treatment and comparison groups would be 
expected to change at the same rate.21
However, for our study outcomes, the UK and 
comparison countries followed diferent trajectories 
before the QOF, violating the parallel trends assumption. 
To address this issue, for each outcome, we created so-
called synthetic comparison groups, matching the UK 
with a weighted combination of non-exposed comparison 
countries based on preintervention mortality and other 
country characteristics.22 Using a standard software 
routine (synth Stata module),37 we derived weights to 
minimise the mean squared diference between the UK 
and comparison countries for age-standardised and sex-
standardised mortality per 100 000 people in each year 
before the start of the QOF, gross domestic product per 
person, unemployment, the Gini coeicient of income 
inequality, and the type of health system.18,23 We created 
separate synthetic comparison groups independently for 
each of the study outcomes. Preintervention levels and 
trends in mortality match almost exactly between the UK 
and the synthetic UK, validating our approach. 
To test the efect of the QOF on mortality, we used 
linear regression to estimate the following equation for 
country j at time t:
UK and high-income countries* Synthetic controls†
UK High-income 
countries‡
All QOF§ Ischaemic heart 
disease
Cancer Non-QOF||
Mortality per 100 000 people¶
All QOF§ 120·6 (29·5) 110·9 (35·4) 122·2 (37·1) ·· (··) ·· (··) ·· (··)
Ischaemic heart disease 79·6 (25·0) 60·9 (23·3) ·· (··) 81·0 (27·7) ·· (··) ·· (··)
Cancer 149·4 (13·8) 140·2 (22·2) ·· (··) ·· (··) 149·1 (28·7) ·· (··)
Non-QOF|| 276·7 (20·9) 280·9 (54·4) ·· (··) ·· (··) ·· (··) 272·9 (46·1)
GDP per person (US$; thousands)** 29·7 (3·8) 29·3 (11·5) 30·8 (12·0) 30·5 (10·3) 31·2 (11·1) 30·5 (11·0)
Unemployment 6·4 (1·6) 7·2 (3·6) 6·5 (3·4) 6·6 (2·9) 6·6 (3·3) 6·3 (4·3)
Gini†† 34·7 (0·7) 31·5 (6·8) 34·2 (6·6) 34·3 (4·3) 33·3 (7·5) 33·4 (8·3)
Population (millions) 59·9 (1·2) 33·6 (57·4) 62·0 (101·4) 56·4 (109·4) 39·0 (87·5) 55·3 (81·5)
Countries 1 27 11 9 11 8
Countries by health system
Etatist social health insurance 0 6 (22%) 2 (18%) 2 (22%) 1 (9%) 2 (25%)
National health insurance 0 5 (19%) 2 (18%) 2 (22%) 3 (27%) 1 (13%)
National health system 1 (100%) 7 (26%) 2 (18%) 2 (22%) 3 (27%) 1 (13%)
Private health insurance 0 1 (4%) 1 (9%) 1 (11%) 1 (9%) 1 (13%)
Social health insurance 0 3 (11%) 1 (9%) 0 0 1 (13%)
Unclassified 0 5 (19%) 3 (27%) 2 (22%) 3 (27%) 2 (25%)
Country-years 17 459 187 153 187 136
Imputed‡‡ 1 (6%) 10 (2%) 4 (2%) 4 (3%) 4 (2%) 0
Data are mean (SD), n, or n (%). QOF=Quality and Outcomes Framework. GDP=Gross domestic product. *Simple (unweighted) mean. †Mean weighted by synthetic weights. 
‡Excluding the UK. §Causes of death potentially sensitive to QOF incentives (ischaemic heart disease, stroke, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension, 
diabetes, and chronic kidney disease). ||All causes of death that were not included in the primary outcome. ¶For ages 0–74 years, standardised for age and sex to the 2004 UK 
population. **At constant 2005 US$. ††Gini coefficient of net income inequality. ‡‡Applicable to mortality only; no imputation done for covariates. Data taken from the 
WHO mortality database,12 the US Census Bureau’s international database,13 the Penn World Tables 8.1,14 the International Labour Organization key indicators of the labour 
market database,15 the standardised world income inequality database,16 and Böhm and colleages.17 
Table 1: Characteristics of the UK and controls, 1994–2010
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Mortalityjt = b0 + (b1 × uj) + (b2 × yeart) + (b3 × [UKj × post-
QOFt]) + ejt where uj is a vector of country ixed efects 
(including the UK), yeart is a vector of year ixed efects, 
UKj is a dummy variable showing that an observation is 
from the UK (showing the independent efect of the UK 
on mortality), post-QOFt is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 after the QOF was implemented (2004–10), 
and ejt is the idiosyncratic error term. The coeicient b0 
is the intercept, b1 captures the country-speciic efects 
on mortality across the entire study period, b2 captures 
secular year efects on mortality, and b3 represents our 
estimate of the efect of the QOF. It shows the 
incremental diference in mortality between the UK and 
the comparison countries in the post-QOF period. We 
estimated this equation separately for each of our study 
outcomes. We weighted our observations by the weights 
that we used to construct the synthetic comparison 
groups. We assessed the signiicance of the efect of the 
QOF using the root mean-squared prediction error ratio 
test,22 a non-parametric permutation test that is 
appropriate when the synthetic control method is used 
(appendix). We constructed 95% CIs that are implied by 
All QOF Ischaemic 
heart 
disease
Cancer Non-QOF
Argentina 0 0 0 0
Australia 0·158 0 0·059 0
Austria 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0 0 0
Chile 0·109 0 0·049 0·135
Denmark 0 0 0·197 0
Finland 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 0 0
Germany 0 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0 0
Iceland 0 0·001 0·028 0
Ireland 0·248 0·358 0·257 0·058
Israel 0 0·046 0·012 0
Italy 0 0 0·032 0
Japan 0 0 0 0·14
Luxembourg 0·033 0 0 0·009
Netherlands 0·065 0·05 0 0·337
New Zealand 0 0·193 0 0
Norway 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0·029 0·009 0 0
Singapore 0·028 0·066 0·146 0·12
South Korea 0·115 0 0 0
Spain 0·04 0 0·025 0·114
Sweden 0 0 0 0
USA 0·166 0·184 0·109 0·087
Uruguay 0·007 0·094 0·084 0
Countries with 
non-zero weights
11 9 11 8
Values denote weights assigned to each country. QOF=Quality and Outcomes 
Framework.
Table 2: Composition of synthetic UK
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Figure: Age-adjusted and sex-adjusted mortality in the UK and comparison 
countries
The dashed vertical line denotes the period immediately preceding the start of 
the QOF. QOF=Quality and Outcomes Framework. 
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these permutation test p-values using the approach 
described by Altman and Bland.24 For the sake of 
comparison, we also report signiicance from parametric 
t tests based on standard errors that were robust to 
country-level clustering. Our analysis used multiple 
imputation to account for missing data (see the 
appendix for detailed procedures).
To show how the results based on the synthetic control 
model difer from those from traditional diference-in-
diferences models, we estimated regression models 
using the full unweighted set of high-income countries. 
The model is identical to the equation listed above, with 
the exception that we included the time-varying matching 
variables as covariates in the regression. We did all 
analyses using Stata version 13.
Role of the funding source
There was no funding source for this study. The 
corresponding author had full access to all the data in the 
study and had inal responsibility for the decision to 
submit for publication. 
Results
Before the start of the QOF, the UK had higher age-
standardised and sex-standardised mortality per 100 000 
population than did the combined set of comparison 
countries for the composite outcome (120·6 [SD 29·5] 
per 100 000 population vs 110·9 [35·4] per 100 000), 
ischaemic heart disease (79·6 [25·0] per 100 000 vs 60·9 
[23·3] per 100 000), and cancer (149·4 [13·8] per 100 000 vs 
140·2 [22·2] per 100 000), and slightly lower mortality for 
causes of death that were not related to the QOF 
(276·7 [20·9] per 100 000 vs 280·9 [54·4] per 100 000; 
table 1). However, the mortalities of the UK and the 
synthetic UK were nearly identical. Other country 
characteristics, consisting of gross domestic product per 
person, unemployment, and the Gini coeicient of 
income inequality, tended to be closer between the UK 
and the synthetic UK than between the UK and all 
comparison countries. 2% of country-year observations 
were imputed.
For each study outcome, the countries that made up 
the synthetic UK showed some similarities and some 
diferences (table 2). South Korea, New Zealand, and 
Denmark each contribute heavily to a single outcome 
(South Korea to the composite outcome, New Zealand to 
ischaemic heart disease, and Denmark to cancer). After 
the QOF was introduced, age-standardised and sex-
standardised mortality for the composite outcome, 
ischaemic heart disease, and cancer decreased at a 
similar rate for the UK and the synthetic UK (igure). By 
contrast, mortality for all disorders that were not targeted 
by the QOF decreased at a slower rate in the UK than in 
the synthetic UK.
Table 3 shows the diference-in-diferences estimates 
of the association between the QOF and population 
mortality. All estimates are interpreted as a change in 
mortality per 100 000 population compared with mortality 
if the QOF had not been implemented. Estimates from 
the standard diference-in-diferences speciication show 
that the QOF was associated with lower mortality for the 
composite outcome (–12·81 per 100 000 people [95% CI 
–17·42 to –8·21]; p<0·0001), ischaemic heart disease 
(–16·38 per 100 000 [–20·32 to –12·44]; p<0·0001), and 
cancer (–2·64 per 100 000 [–5·13 to –0·15]; p=0·038) than 
that without the QOF, but signiicantly higher mortality 
for all non-targeted causes of death (11·33 per 100 000 
[5·12–17·54]; p=0·0008). However, these estimates are 
biased by non-parallel trends between the UK and the 
entire set of high-income countries. Estimates from the 
synthetic comparison speciication in which trends are 
parallel between the UK and the synthetic UK show that 
the QOF was not signiicantly associated with mortality 
for the composite outcome (–3·68 per 100 000 [–8·16 to 
0·80]; p=0·107), ischaemic heart disease (–2·21 per 
100 000 [–6·86 to 2·44]; p=0·357), cancer (0·28 per 
100 000 [–0·99 to 1·55]; p=0·679), or all non-targeted 
disorders (11·60 per 100 000 [95% CI –3·91 to 27·11]; 
All QOF Ischaemic heart disease Cancer Non-QOF
DD SC DD SC DD SC DD SC
Estimate –12·81 –3·68 –16·38 –2·21 –2·64 0·28 11·33 11·60
p value* ·· 0·107 ·· 0·357 ·· 0·679 ·· 0·143
95% CI implied by p value ·· –8·16 to 0·80 ·· –6·86 to 2·44 ·· –0·99 to 1·55 ·· –3·91 to 27·11
p value from t test† <0·0001 0·682 <0·0001 0·766 0·038 0·894 0·0008 0·083
95% CI from t test –17·42 to 
–8·21
–23·23 to 
15·88
–20·32 to 
–12·44
–18·86 to 
14·44
–5·13 to 
–0·15
–4·38 to 4·94 5·12 to 
17·54
–2·01 to 25·22
Difference in trend‡ –1·49 –0·12 –2·16 ·01 –0·75 –0·33 2·01 1·05
Countries 28§ 12¶ 28§ 10¶ 28§ 12¶ 28§ 9¶
Country-years 476§ 204¶ 476§ 170¶ 476§ 204¶ 476§ 153¶
Coefficients for model covariates are provided in the appendix. DD=difference-in-differences. SC=Difference-in-differences with synthetic control. *From permutation test. 
†Based on standard errors robust to country-level clustering. ‡Difference in preintervention linear trend between treatment and comparison group, 1994–2003. §Includes UK 
and all comparison countries. ¶Includes UK and all comparison countries with non-zero weights. 
Table 3: Estimates of the effect of the QOF on age-adjusted and sex-adjusted mortality per 100 000 population
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p=0·143). When the synthetic comparison group was 
used, statistical inference was consistent (p>0·05 for all 
outcomes) for the parametric and non-parametric signi-
icance tests. Extensive sensitivity analysis substantiated 
our main results (appendix).
Discussion
Our results show that introduction of the QOF in the UK 
was not signiicantly associated with changes in 
population mortality for disease areas that were targeted 
by the programme. We recorded that the QOF was also 
not signiicantly associated with changes in mortality for 
disease areas that were not targeted by the programme. 
Extensive research into pay-for-performance programmes 
has yet to show clear patient beneits.25–27 The QOF is a 
unique programme, covering almost the entire UK 
population through an enormous investment: about 
£5·86 billion (US$9 billion) was invested in incentive 
payments during the irst 7 years of the QOF, with 
additional billions invested in programme administration 
and information technology support. Although research 
suggests that the QOF improved quality for incentivised 
activities in its early years, albeit at the possible expense 
of quality for some non-incentivised aspects of care,7 this 
improvement seemed to attenuate with time.8 Findings 
from some studies suggest that the QOF led to better 
intermediate outcomes28 and fewer emergency hospital 
admissions for some disorders, including ischaemic 
heart disease, than without the QOF.29 As a result, the 
QOF might reasonably be expected to have reduced 
population mortality.30 Extrapolations on the basis of 
improvements for the incentivised indicators estimated 
that the QOF reduced mortality by 11 deaths per 100 000 
people in 2004.9 Yet, evidence suggests that local variation 
in quality performance in the QOF was not associated 
with mortality within England.31 By comparing mortality 
between the UK and comparable countries that were not 
exposed to national-scale pay-for-performance, our study 
provides the irst cross-national evidence for the efects 
of pay-for-performance on population health.
The apparent failure of such a large and sustained 
programme to reduce mortality suggests that faults 
might exist in the general approach of use of inancial 
incentives to improve population outcomes or in the 
speciic design of the QOF. Possible explanations include 
reported improvements because of improved recording 
or gaming, an absence of a direct efect of incentivised 
aspects of care on mortality, insuiciently large or 
mistargeted inancial incentives, setting of suboptimum 
clinical targets, and insuiciently challenging achieve-
ment thresholds.30 Alternative programme designs might 
have resulted in greater reductions in population 
mortality than with the QOF design. The efects of 
improved primary care on mortality could possibly be 
slight in comparison with other factors, including 
socioeconomic determinants, and could not be noted in 
population-level data. The QOF could possibly have 
improved non-fatal outcomes, but we were not able to 
note these outcomes in our study.
Our study has various limitations. Variation in coding 
practices and classiication systems can introduce 
random error into international comparative analysis of 
mortality statistics.20 Although we accounted for ill-
deined codes in vital registration systems and statistically 
adjusted discontinuous mortality that resulted from 
countries switching from the ICD9 to ICD10 coding 
system, country-speciic variation in cause of death 
coding will remain. However, unless idiosyncrasies in 
mortality data and coding practices aligned with the start 
of the QOF, they would not be expected to bias our 
results.
The large diference in estimates between our 
traditional diference-in-diferences and synthetic control 
speciications shows the challenges associated with 
identiication of the efects of the QOF in the context of 
steep mortality decreases in the UK before the 
programme’s introduction. Additionally, the QOF was 
not the only reason why mortality would have changed in 
our study period: various other changes in population 
risk factors and medical care occurred in both the UK 
and the comparison countries.32 Although no other 
inancial incentive programmes were implemented that 
came close to matching the scale of the QOF, various 
programmes were implemented in countries in the study 
sample. Yet, our preferred synthetic control approach, 
which succeeded in creating comparison groups that 
closely matched the UK, accounted for diferences in 
background improvements, helping to isolate the efect 
of the QOF. Although we cannot compare the efect of 
the QOF with no intervention in the comparison groups, 
we can say that the QOF did not seem to generate 
incremental improvements in mortality when compared 
with the general improvements—perhaps encouraged by 
payment policy or other reforms—that were noted in 
comparable countries. By analogy with terminology from 
clinical trials, we do not interpret our results as a 
comparison between treatment and no treatment study 
arms, but rather between treatment and usual care.
Our analysis might have been underpowered to detect 
efects of the QOF on mortality. The substantial variance 
of population mortality estimates could have decreased 
our ability to detect signiicant efects. Although use of 
non-parametric permutation tests for statistical inference 
was necessary because of violations of standard statistical 
assumptions,22 these tests are conservative. Our 
permutation tests could therefore possibly have failed to 
reject the null hypothesis when the QOF did in fact 
reduce mortality. However, even the smaller variance 
estimates from the standard diference-in-diferences 
models would not have afected our study inferences, 
and our results were not sensitive to our use of parametric 
or non-parametric methods for statistical inference.
Finally, a longer study period than the one we used 
could possibly be needed for risk factor reduction and 
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disease management in primary care to be manifested 
in population mortality. However, evidence from trials33 
and natural experiments34 suggests that pharmacological 
interventions and improvements in risk factors result 
in striking reductions in mortality for disorders such as 
ischaemic heart disease during short timeframes.35 Any 
efect on mortality of a large-scale intervention such as 
the QOF would therefore probably become evident 
within the irst 7 years of implementation.
Programmes that use payments to physicians and 
health-care institutions to incentivise high-quality care 
have a strong foothold in several countries and are 
especially well developed in the UK and USA. Our 
research raises questions about whether pay-for-
performance in other settings is a viable method to 
improve population health. For example, as a result of 
the Patient Protection and Afordable Care Act in the 
USA, pay-for-performance programmes have proliferated 
through Medicare.36 Although design laws might have 
undermined the efect of the QOF,30 if a programme with 
the size and scope of the QOF was not associated with 
statistically greater reductions in population mortality 
than without the QOF, less ambitious programmes than 
the QOF—such as those in the USA—might be even less 
likely to reduce mortality. Pay-for-performance pro-
grammes will continue to develop, hopefully in ways that 
incentivise higher value care than without them.30 The 
costs and efectiveness of pay-for-performance with other 
health system interventions should be explored to better 
understand how resources can best be used to improve 
population health.
Contributors
All authors conceived and designed the study, analysed and interpreted 
data, and drafted and critically revised the report. SK acquired data.
Declaration of interests
The authors declare no competing interests. 
Acknowledgments
We thank Amy VanderZanden of the Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation for providing detailed tables supporting the cause of death 
groupings used in this report and Kristin Maurer for providing research 
assistance for this study. 
References
1 Starield B, Shi L, Macinko J. Contribution of primary care to health 
systems and health. Mil Quart 2005; 83: 457–502.
2 Bellamy D, Smith J. Role of primary care in early diagnosis and 
efective management of COPD. Int J Clin Pract 2007; 61: 1380–89.
3 Flanagan DE, Cox P, Paine D, Davies J, Armitage M. 
Secondary prevention of coronary heart disease in primary care: 
a healthy heart initiative. Q JM 1999; 92: 245–50.
4 McGlynn EA, Asch SM, Adams J, et al. The quality of health care 
delivered to adults in the United States. N Eng J Med 2003; 
348: 2635–45.
5 Leatherman S, Berwick D, Iles D, et al. The business case for 
quality: case studies and an analysis. Health Af (Millwood) 2003; 
22: 17–30.
6 Roland M. Linking physicians’ pay to the quality of care—a major 
experiment in the United Kingdom. N Eng J Med 2004; 
351: 1448–54.
7 Doran T, Kontopantelis E, Valderas JM, et al. Efect of inancial 
incentives on incentivised and non-incentivised clinical activities: 
longitudinal analysis of data from the UK Quality and Outcomes 
Framework. BMJ 2011; 342: d3590.
15
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Articles
8 www.thelancet.com   Vol 387
32 Ford ES, Capewell S. Proportion of the decline in cardiovascular 
mortality disease due to prevention versus treatment: public health 
versus clinical care. Ann Rev Public Health 2011; 32: 5–22.
33 LaRosa J, He J, Vupputuri S. Efect of statins on risk of coronary 
disease: a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials. JAMA 
1999; 282: 2340–46.
34 Zatonski W, Campos H, Willett W. Rapid declines in coronary heart 
disease mortality in eastern Europe are associated with increased 
consumption of oils rich in alpha-linolenic acid. Eur J Epidemiol 
2008; 23: 3–10.
35 Capewell S, O’Flaherty M. Can dietary changes rapidly decrease 
cardiovascular mortality rates? Eur Heart J 2011; 32: 187–89.
36 Ryan AM, Damberg CL. What can the past of pay-for-performance 
tell us about the future of value-based purchasing in Medicare? 
Healthcare 2013; 1: 42–49.
37 Abadie A, Diamond A, Hainmueller J. SYNTH: Stata module to 
implement synthetic control methods for comparative case studies. 
http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s457334.htm 
(accessed April 6, 2016).
